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1 Introduction
Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to
study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments.
The model as written down by Ericson & Pakes (1995), Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001)
(hereafter, EP, PM1, and PM2), the subsequent literature (e.g., Gowrisankaran 1999, Fer-
shtman & Pakes 2000, Benkard 2004), and in standard textbook treatments of stochastic
games (e.g., Filar & Vrieze 1997, Basar & Olsder 1999) assumes that the states of all players
change at exactly the same point in each period (say at the end of the period). That is,
the transitions from this period’s state to next period’s state are simultaneous. As PM2
and Doraszelski & Judd (2004) (hereafter, DJ) point out, these games with simultaneous
state-to-state transitions suffer from a “curse of dimensionality” since the cost of computing
players’ expectations over all possible future states increases exponentially in the number
of state variables.
However, there are many other ways to formulate dynamic stochastic games, and some
of them may be computationally more tractable than others. In particular, we show that
there are games with sequential state-to-state transitions that do not suffer from the curse
of dimensionality in the expectation over successor states.
2 Model
In this section we describe a discrete-time, finite-state stochastic game with sequential state-
to-state transitions. Perhaps the simplest model is that each period one player is picked at
random to choose an action. The state of the player with the move then changes in response
∗Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A., doraszelski@harvard.edu.
†Stanford, CA 94305-6010, U.S.A., judd@hoover.stanford.edu.
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to its chosen action. Then another random draw is taken to pick a player, and so on. Our
game may thus be thought of as a “random-leadership Stackelberg game:” When a player
chooses an action it knows that it is the leader at this point in time and that its rivals are
the followers.
The notation is the same as in DJ. As in the discrete-time model with simultaneous
state-to-state transitions, the horizon is infinite, the state of the game at period t is ωt ∈ Ω,
there are N players, and player i’s action in period t is denoted by xit ∈ Xi (ωt).
We let pii,j(xt, ωt) denote the per-period payoff to player i when player j has the move,
players’ actions are xt =
(
x1t , . . . , x
N
t
)
, and the state is ωt =
(
ω1t , . . . , ω
N
t
)
. We make the
assumption that
Assumption 1 Per-period payoffs pii,j(xt, ωt) can be written as{
pii,i(xit, ωt), j = i,
pii,j(ωt), j 6= i.
(1)
That is, if player i has the move, then its per-period payoff depends on its own action but
not those of its rivals as well as on the state, whereas its per-period payoff depends solely on
the state if it does not have the move. To simplify the notation we set Φi(xt, ωt, ωt+1) = 0
in what follows.
We further make the assumption that the state-to-state transitions in a period are
controlled entirely by the action of the player with the move alone and that a player’s state
can change only if it has the move. In this case
Assumption 2 The law of motion is
Pr
(
ω′|ωt, xt
)
=
{
Pri
(
(ω′)i |ωit, xit
)
, (ω′)−i = ω−it ,
0, otherwise.
(2)
We note from the outset that Assumptions 1 and 2, while critical for computational tractabil-
ity, may be questionable in some applications of EP’s framework (see Section 4.3 for details).
Two further comments are in order: First, because players move sequentially instead of
simultaneously, the expected net present value of future cash flows to a player if it has the
move in the current period is in general different than if the player does not have the move.
Consequently, the value function of the player depends not only on the state of the game
but also on the identity of the player with the move.1
Second, in the model with sequential state-to-state transitions, a player’s state can
change once in every N periods on average, whereas it can change once in every period
in the model with simultaneous transitions. To make the models comparable in terms of
the frequency of changes, we therefore shorten the length of a period in the model with
sequential transitions and replace the discount factor β by N
√
β.
1Put differently, the identity of the player with the move becomes part of the state of the game.
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Let V i,j(ω) denote the expected net present value of future cash flows to player i if
player j has the move and the state is ω. If player i has the move (j = i), then its Bellman
equation is
V i,i(ω) = max
xi
pii,i(xi, ω) + N
√
βEk′,(ω′)i
{
V i,k
′ ((
ω′
)i
, ω−i
)
|ωi, xi
}
, (3)
where k′ denotes the next player to move. Since the identity of the next player to move is
a random variable, players form expectations over it. Player i’s strategy is given by
Xi(ω) = argmax
xi
pii,i(xi, ω) + N
√
βEk′,(ω′)i
{
V i,k
′ ((
ω′
)i
, ω−i
)
|ωi, xi
}
. (4)
If player i does not have the move (j 6= i), then its Bellman equation is
V i,j(ω) = pii,j(ω) + N
√
βEk′,(ω′)j
{
V i,k
′ ((
ω′
)j
, ω−j
)
|ωj , Xj(ω)
}
. (5)
The main advantage of the model with sequential state-to-state transitions now becomes
clear. In the model with simultaneous transitions, there is one Bellman equation for player
i and it contains one N -dimensional expectation that consists of KN terms (assuming
that a player can move to one of K states). In comparison, in the model with sequential
transitions, there are N Bellman equations for player i (equation (3) plus N−1 incarnations
of equation (5)). Each of them contains one one-dimensional expectation that consists of
K terms. Since this yields a total of KN terms, sequential transitions break the curse of
dimensionality.
The remaining problem with the model with sequential state-to-state transitions is that
there are N Bellman equations for player i compared to one Bellman equation in the model
with simultaneous transitions. Fortunately, this problem is easy to solve. Define
V
i(ω) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
V i,j(ω) (6)
to be the expected value function. Substituting equation (6) into equations (3)–(5) yields
V i,i(ω) = max
xi
pii,i(xi, ω) + N
√
βE(ω′)i
{
V
i
((
ω′
)i
, ω−i
)
|ωi, xi
}
, (7)
Xi(ω) = argmax
xi
pii,i(xi, ω) + N
√
βE(ω′)i
{
V
i
((
ω′
)i
, ω−i
)
|ωi, xi
}
, (8)
V i,j(ω) = pii,j(ω) + N
√
βE(ω′)j
{
V
i
((
ω′
)j
, ω−j
)
|ωj , Xj(ω)
}
. (9)
While V i,j(ω) and Xi(ω) are the value and policy functions after it is known that player j
has the move, V i(ω) is the value function before it is known who is next to move. Adding
3
equation (7) and equation (9) for all j 6= i yields
V
i(ω) =
1
N
{
max
xi
pii,i(xi, ω) + N
√
βE(ω′)i
{
V
i
((
ω′
)i
, ω−i
)
|ωi, xi
}
+
∑
j 6=i
pii,j(ω) + N
√
βE(ω′)j
{
V
i
((
ω′
)j
, ω−j
)
|ωj , Xj(ω)
}}
, (10)
Xi(ω) = argmax
xi
pii,i(xi, ω) + N
√
βE(ω′)i
{
V
i
((
ω′
)i
, ω−i
)
|ωi, xi
}
. (11)
Now there is one Bellman equations for player i, just as in the model with simultaneous
transitions. Moreover, equation (10) contains N one-dimensional expectations that consist
of K terms each. Again this yields a total of KN terms, and sequential state-to-state
transitions break the curse of dimensionality.
3 Computational Aspects
This section illustrates the computational advantages of sequential state-to-state transitions
using the quality ladder model of Section 4 of DJ as an example.2 Our algorithm for the
model with sequential transitions adapts the block Gauss-Seidel scheme in Section 3.1 of
DJ.
For the sake of brevity, we omit a full-fledged comparison of the time per iteration and the
number of iterations and instead focus on the time to convergence. The left panel of Table
1 illustrates this comparison and the total gain from sequential state-to-state transitions.
In addition, it reports on the continuous-time model in DJ. Note that the results in Table
1 differ somewhat from those in Table 4 in DJ because we used different hardware.
As can be seen from the middle panel of Table 1, the discrete-time model with sequential
state-to-state transitions suffers an “iteration penalty.” Even though it needs more itera-
tions, the loss in the number of iterations is small when compared to the gain from avoiding
the curse of dimensionality. Overall, the discrete-time model with sequential transitions is
much faster to solve than the discrete-time model with simultaneous transitions, but not
quite as fast as the continuous-time model. In fact, as comparing the middle and right
panels of Table 1 shows, the gain from avoiding the curse of dimensionality is smaller and
the loss in the number of iterations is larger in the discrete-time model with sequential
state-to-state transitions than in the continuous-time model.
In ongoing research we investigate whether extrapolation techniques can be used to
alleviate the iteration penalty in the model with sequential state-to-state transitions.
2Recall that we shorten the length of a period in the model with sequential transitions by a factor of
N . To make the model comparable to the model with simultaneous transitions, we accordingly decrease
per-period payoffs by a factor of N .
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4 Conceptual Aspects
In Section 3 we have emphasized the computational advantages of sequential state-to-state
transitions. Several other issues have to be considered in deciding whether to formulate an
economic problem as a game with sequential or simultaneous transitions.
4.1 Economic Mechanism
Perhaps the main issue that has to be addressed is what economic mechanism gives rise
to sequential state-to-state transitions. That is, is there a plausible story for why players
are handed the move one after the other in a random order? The answer will undoubtedly
depend on the application at hand.
Note that in some applications of EP’s framework a player controls D > 1 coordinates of
the state (e.g., Benkard 2004, Langohr 2003). If all states of a player are allowed to change
at once, then computing the expectation over successor states involves summing over NKD
terms and thus suffers from a curse of dimensionality in D (but not in N). Alternatively
one may extend our assumption that each period one player is picked at random to choose
an action by postulating that, in addition, one coordinate of the state is picked at random
and allowed to change, but it may be hard to motivate this assumption in an economically
meaningful fashion.
4.2 Equilibrium and Dynamics
It is not obvious how players’ behavior in equilibrium and the dynamics of the game implied
by that behavior change as the model is recast with sequential state-to-state transitions.
For example, in a preemption race (Fudenberg, Gilbert, Stiglitz & Tirole 1983, Harris &
Vickers 1987) an early mover has a head start over a late mover, so that handing one
player the move may well be decisive for the outcome of the race. This suggests that the
Stackelberg character of the game with sequential transitions may have repercussions for
players’ behavior.
It turns out that in the quality ladder model the differences between sequential and
simultaneous state-to-state transitions are very small. Figure 1 illustrates this point by
plotting the equilibrium value and policy functions for the case of N = 2 firms and M = 18
quality levels per firm.
From the equilibrium policy function we construct the probability distribution over next
period’s state
(
(ω′)1 , (ω′)2
)
given this period’s state
(
ω1, ω2
)
, i.e., the transition probability
matrix that characterizes the Markov process of industry dynamics. This allows us to use
stochastic process theory to analyze the Markov process of industry dynamics rather than
rely on simulation. We compute the transient distribution over states in period t, µt(·),
starting from state (1, 1). This tells us how likely each possible industry structure is in
period t, given that both firms began the game at the minimal quality level. In addition, we
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compute the limiting (or ergodic) distribution over states, µ∞(·).3 The transient distribution
captures short-run dynamics and the limiting distribution captures long-run (or steady-
state) dynamics.
Figure 1 also depicts the limiting distribution. As can be seen, the differences between
sequential and simultaneous state-to-state transitions are very small. Table 2 summarizes
the dynamics of the industry. We list the most likely industry structure (modal state) and its
probability at various points in time. Note that, because we shorten the length of a period
in the model with sequential transitions by a factor of 2, the transient distribution in period
t in the model with simultaneous transitions is comparable to the transient distribution in
period 2t in the model with sequential transitions. As can be seen, in the short run the
industry evolves either in a symmetric or an asymmetric fashion. However, even if a firm is
able to gain the upper hand over its rival in the short run, in the long run the most likely
industry structure is symmetric and the limiting distribution leaves little probability mass
on asymmetric industry structures (see again Figure 1). In addition, we report a firm’s
expected profit from product market competition and its expected investment in quality
improvements along with their standard deviations in Table 2. Again the differences between
sequential and simultaneous state-to-state transitions are very small. It is an open issue
whether the same is true in other examples besides the quality ladder model.
4.3 Discussion of Assumptions and Range of Applications
Not all economic problems are well-suited to be formulated with sequential state-to-state
transitions. In the remainder of this section, we argue that the structure of per-period
payoffs and law of motion in Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively, may be questionable in
some applications of EP’s framework. We show that relaxing either one of these restrictions
substantially increases the computational burden: Absent Assumption 1 the dimension of
the state vector is expanded; in addition, the curse of dimensionality is resurrected absent
Assumption 2.
4.3.1 Per-Period Payoffs
According to Assumption 1, if player i has the move, then its per-period payoff depends
on its own action but not those of its rivals as well as on the state, whereas its per-period
payoff depends solely on the state if it does not have the move. This structure of per-period
payoffs entails a hidden assumption in most applications of EP’s framework. The key fact
to remember is that per-period payoffs are usually derived from the Nash equilibrium of
a product market game. In the quality ladder model, for example, in each period firm i
3Let P be the M2 ×M2 transition probability matrix. The transient distribution in period t is given
by µt = µ0P t, where µ0 is the 1 ×M2 initial distribution and P t the tth matrix power of P . The Markov
process turns out to be irreducible. That is, all its states belong to a single closed communicating class and
the 1×M2 limiting distribution µ∞ solves the system of linear equations µ∞ = µ∞P .
8
most likely profit investment
t industry structure prob. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
5 (2,1), (1,2) 0.1177 1.20 3.02 2.20 1.12
10 (3,3) 0.0510 4.57 7.12 2.32 1.19
25 (7,1), (1,7) 0.0301 8.60 9.32 1.46 0.93
50 (7,7) 0.0307 7.78 8.18 0.97 0.61
100 (8,7), (7,8) 0.0360 6.74 6.56 0.90 0.53
∞ (8,7), (7,8) 0.0404 6.14 5.27 0.91 0.51
most likely profit investment
t industry structure prob. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
10 (2,1), (1,2) 0.1160 1.43 3.68 2.25 1.15
20 (3,3) 0.0488 4.86 7.56 2.35 1.21
50 (7,1), (1,7) 0.0300 8.75 9.46 1.46 0.94
100 (7,7) 0.0305 7.78 8.17 0.98 0.61
200 (8,7), (7,8) 0.0363 6.66 6.39 0.91 0.53
∞ (8,7), (7,8) 0.0406 6.08 5.10 0.91 0.50
Table 2: Most likely industry structure and its probability, expected profit and investment
and their standard deviations. Simultaneous (upper panel) and sequential state-to-state
transitions (lower panel). Quality ladder model with N = 2 firms, M = 18 quality levels
per firm, and a discount factor of β = 0.925.
chooses the price pi of product i after deciding on its investment xi in quality improvements
(see Section 4 of DJ for details). Allowing firm i’s per-period payoff to depend solely on the
quality of its and its rivals’ products as encoded in ω =
(
ω1, . . . , ωN
)
and on its investment
xi if it has the move thus presumes that firm i is able to reoptimize its price in response
to each change in ω. Hence, recasting the quality ladder model as a game with sequential
state-to-state transitions and per-period payoffs satisfying Assumption 1 entails that a firm
gets to choose its price once in every period but its investment on average once in every N
periods. Depending on the details of the institutional setting one may be able to justify this
assumption by arguing that prices are less rigid than investments. If this is not possible,
then one has to replace Assumption 1 with the assumption that a firm can choose both
its price and its investment only when it has the move. However, as we show below, this
alternative assumption causes the dimension of the state vector to expand and thus adds
to the computational burden.
Assumption 1 is also difficult to maintain in applications of EP’s framework where there
is no distinction between actions (such as price) that affect per-period payoffs but not state-
to-state transitions and actions (such as investment) that affect both. For example, in a
learning-by-doing model such as Benkard (2004), a firm’s output decision determines not
only how much it receives in the product market but also how far it moves down the learning
9
curve. In cases like this, per-period payoffs depend on the actions of all players, irrespective
of whether they have the move or not.
To explore the consequences of giving up Assumption 1 let us assume that a player
remains committed to the chosen action until it once again has the move. Since the chosen
action affects the per-period payoff of player i for the entire duration, we write the per-
period payoff to player i as pii,j(xt, ωt). In the learning-by-doing model, xit is the output of
firm i. In the quality ladder model, we have xit =
(
xi,1t , x
i,2
t
)
, where xi,1t denotes investment
and xi,2t denotes price, and the per-period payoff to player i can be simplified to{
pii,i(xi,1t , x
1,2
t , . . . , x
N,2
t , ωt), j = i,
pii,j(x1,2t , . . . , x
N,2
t , ωt), j 6= i.
That is, if player i has the move (j = i), then its per-period payoff depends on its investment
and all prices and it depends on all prices if player i does not have the move (j 6= i).
The key fact is that if the per-period payoff to player i is pii,j(xt, ωt), then, from the
point of view of the player with the move, the actions of the other players are part of the
state of the game, similar to Maskin & Tirole (1988a, 1988b). To see this more clearly, let
V i,j(ω, x−j) denote the expected net present value of future cash flows to player i if player j
has the move, the state is ω, and players other than j are locked into actions x−j . If player
i has the move (j = i), then the Bellman equation (3) becomes
V i,i(ω, x−i) = max
xi
pii,i(xi, x−i, ω) + βEk′,(ω′)i
{
V i,k
′ ((
ω′
)i
, ω−i, xi, x−i,k
′) |ωi, xi} , (12)
where x−i,k′ is obtained from x by deleting xi and xk′ . Note that while the locked-in actions
in x−i do not enter into the state-to-state transitions, they enter into the per-period payoff
of player i and are therefore part of the state of the game. Similarly, if player i does not
have the move (j 6= i), then the Bellman equation (5) becomes
V i,j(ω, x−j) = pii,j(Xj(ω, x−j), x−j , ω)+βEk′,(ω′)j
{
V i,k
′ ((
ω′
)j
, ω−j , Xj(ω, x−j), x−j,k
′) |ωj , Xj(ω, x−j)} .
(13)
As can be seen by comparing equations (12) and (13) with equations (3) and (5), re-
spectively, the dimension of the state vector is expanded. In this setting, discrete actions
pose a problem insofar as the number of states that have to be examined to compute an
equilibrium grows rapidly in the number of state variables, thereby increasing both time
and memory requirements. Continuous actions, by contrast, require an entirely different set
of techniques to compute an equilibrium since players’ values and policies can no longer be
represented as vectors and instead have to be represented as functions. Judd (1998) gives
an introduction to these so-called projection techniques and Rui & Miranda (1996, 2001),
Doraszelski (2003), and Hall, Royer & Van Audenrode (2003) apply them to dynamic games
with a continuum of states.
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4.3.2 Law of Motion
Turning to the law of motion, according to Assumption 2 a player’s state can change only
if it has the move. This structure may be inappropriate for some applications of EP’s
framework. Consider again the learning-by-doing model. Given that the firm remains
committed to its output decision on average for N periods in the model with sequential
state-to-state transitions, it seems strange to assume that its position on the learning curve
as represented by its state can change only in the period it has the move. A more natural
assumption as that the firm’s output decision affects its per-period payoff as well as the
transitions in its state for the entire duration until it once again has the move, contrary to
Assumption 2.
To explore the consequences of giving up Assumption 2 let us assume that a player
remains committed to the chosen action until it once again has the move. Moreover, the
state-to-state transitions in a period are controlled by the currently chosen action of the
player with the move and the previously chosen actions of its rivals. In this case the law of
motion is
Pr
(
ω′|ωt, xt
)
=
N∏
i=1
Pri
((
ω′
)i |ωit, xit)
and the curse of dimensionality in computing the expectation over successor states is resur-
rected. In addition, because the locked-in actions enter into the state-to-state transitions,
players’ actions are part of the state of the game.
5 Concluding Remarks
There are many ways to formulate dynamic stochastic games, and some of them are compu-
tationally more tractable than others. DJ propose continuous-time models in order to avoid
the curse of dimensionality in the expectation over successor states. In this note we study
discrete-time games with sequential state-to-state transitions. Our assumption is that each
period one player is picked at random to choose an action and that the player’s state then
changes in response.
There are a number of issues that require more thought. First, it may be possible to
alleviate the iteration penalty in the model with sequential state-to-state transitions, thus
making it more competitive to the continuous-time model in DJ.
Second, the issue how players’ behavior in equilibrium and the dynamics of the game
implied by that behavior change as the model is recast with sequential state-to-state transi-
tions merits further attention. While the differences are minor in the quality ladder model,
this is just a particular example.
Third, there clearly are alternative assumptions that avoid the simultaneous state-to-
state transitions in EP, PM1, and PM2 and thus also the curse of dimensionality. For
example, one may assume that each period all players choose actions but that then one
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player is picked at random and its state is allowed to change in response to its previously
chosen action. An important task for future research is therefore to describe more generally
the class of discrete-time models that do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality.
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